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Abstract
We study interactions between monetary policy, which sets nominal interest rates, and scal
policy, which levies distortionary income taxes to nance public goods, in a standard, sticky-
price economy with monopolistic competition. Policymakersinability to commit in advance to
future policies gives rise to excessive ination and excessive public spending, resulting in wel-
fare losses equivalent to several percent of consumption each period. We show how appointing
a conservative monetary authority, which dislikes ination more than society does, can consid-
erably reduce these welfare losse and that optimally the monetary authority is predominatly
concerned about ination. Full conservatism, i.e., exclusive concern about ination, entirely
eliminates the welfare losses from discretionary monetary and scal policymaking, provided
monetary policy is determined after scal policy each period. Full conservatism, however, is
severely suboptimal when monetary policy is determined simultaneously with scal policy or
before scal policy each period.
Keywords: discretion, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, policy biases, sequential non-
cooperative policy games
JEL classication: E52, E62, E63
1 Introduction
The problem of designing institutional frameworks that cope best with discretionary behavior
of policymakers has received much attention following the seminal work of Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and of Barro and Gordon (1983). In particular, to overcome the inationary
bias caused by discretionary conduct of monetary policy, Rogo¤ (1985) proposed appointing
a conservativecentral banker, who dislikes ination more than society does.
More recently, Adam and Billi (2008) have shown ination conservatism à la Rogo¤ also
to be desirable in a setting with discretionary scal policy: besides overcoming the ination-
ary bias, monetary conservatism can also eliminate the public-spending bias stemming from
discretionary public spending. But an unsatisfactory aspect of the analysis is the assumed
availability of lump-sum taxes, which contrasts with the observation that governments must
typically rely on distortionary tax instruments to raise revenue. Previous research, therefore,
ignored an important source of economic distortions associated with the discretionary conduct
of scal policy.
To address this shortcoming, this paper studies the interactions between discretionary
monetary and scal policy in a setting with distortionary taxes. Monetary policy sets nominal
interest rates and scal policy provides public goods, which are nanced with a labor-income
tax that distorts labor-supply decisions. We conduct the analysis in a dynamic, general-
equilibrium model, with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. The presence of
monopoly power and distortionary income taxes causes output to fall below its rst-best level
and provides discretionary policymakers an incentive to stimulate output.
We show analytically that discretionary scal policy gives rise to a public-spending bias
when prices are stable, while discretionary monetary policy gives rise to an inationary bias.
In our numerical analysis we nd these policy biases to be quantitatively important and also
an order of magnitude larger than in a setting with lump-sum taxes. This is so because
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distortionary labor-income taxes amplify the e¤ects of discretionary scal policy in a vicious
circle. A higher level of public spending requires higher taxes, which depress labor supply and
output. This in turn increases further the incentives for discretionary public spending. As a
consequence, also the welfare loss is found to be much larger than with lump-sum taxes and
is equivalent to a loss of several percent of consumption each period. This nding holds true
even when abstracting from the welfare costs of ination.
In our general-equilibrium model of the economy, we then study the equilibrium outcomes
of a non-cooperative game between a discretionary scal authority, which maximizes social
welfare, and a discretionary monetary authority, which dislikes ination more than society
does. We show that appointing such an ination-conservative monetary authority can greatly
reduce the welfare loss due to discretionary policymaking and that a high degree of monetary
conservatism is optimal across a very wide range of model parameterizations. Monetary
conservatism can even entirely eliminate the steady-state distortions due to discretionary
monetary and scal policy when monetary policy can impose discipline on public spending by
moving after scal policy each period. Although a high degree of monetary conservatism is
found to be optimal for any timing assumption on the sequence of moves between monetary
an scal policy, exclusive focus on ination on the side of the monetary authority is optimal
only when monetary policy moves after scal policy each period. Otherwise, moving from
the optimal (and high) degree of conservatism to full conservatism gives rise to large welfare
losses. As we show, after some point the welfare gains from further ination reductions are
outweighed by the increasing distortions in scal policy decisions that result from reduced
ination.
The second section describes the model. The third section explains the policy biases.
The fourth section quanties them. And the fth section quanties the e¤ects of ination
conservatism. Technical details are in the appendix.
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2 The model
This section describes a sticky-price economy with monopolistic competition and separate
monetary and scal policy authorities. The setting is based on the model used in Adam
and Billi (2008), but relaxes the strong assumption of lump-sum taxes by considering instead
distortionary labor-income taxes. We rst describe the private sector and the government and
thereafter dene a private-sector equilibrium.
2.1 Private sector
There is a continuum of identical households with preferences given by
1X
t=0
tu(ct; ht; gt); (1)
where ct is consumption of an aggregate consumption good, ht 2 (0; 1) is labor e¤ort, gt is
public-goods provision by the government in the form of aggregate consumption goods, and
 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. Utility is separable in c; h; and g: In addition, uc > 0, ucc < 0,
uh < 0, uhh  0, ug > 0, and ugg < 0. Furthermore,
 cuccuc  and huhhuh  are bounded.
Each household produces a di¤erentiated intermediate good. Demand for this good is
ytd( ePt=Pt), where yt is (private and public) demand for the aggregate good, and ePt=Pt is
the relative price of the intermediate good compared with the aggregate good. The demand
function d() satises d(1) = 1 and d0(1) = , where  <  1 is the price elasticity of demand
for the di¤erent goods. The demand function is consistent with optimizing behavior when
private and public consumption goods are a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the goods produced
by di¤erent households. Each household chooses ePt, and hires labor e¤ort eht to satisfy the
resulting product demand, i.e., eht = ytd ePt
Pt
!
: (2)
As in Rotemberg (1982), sluggish nominal-price adjustment is described by quadratic-
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resource costs of adjusting prices according to

2
 ePtePt 1   1
!2
;
where  > 0 indexes the degree of price stickiness.1
Householdsbudget constraint is
Ptct +Bt = Rt 1Bt 1 + Pt
24 ePt
Pt
ytd
 ePt
Pt
!
  wteht   
2
 ePtePt 1   1
!235+ Ptwtht(1  t); (3)
where Rt  1 is the gross nominal interest rate.2 Bt are private-issued nominal bonds paying
RtBt in period t + 1, wt is the real wage paid in a competitive labor market, and t is a
(distortionary) labor-income tax rate. Instead of labor-income taxes, we could have considered
taxes on total income (prots and labor income) or consumption taxes. As is well known,
consumption taxes are equivalent to having a labor-income tax together with a lump-sum
tax on prots. We decided to analyze the most distortionary tax system, so we consider
labor-income taxes.
Finally, the no-Ponzi-scheme constraint is
lim
j!1
t+j 1Y
i=0
1
Ri
Bt+j  0: (4)
Based on these assumptions, householdsproblem consists of choosing {ct; ht;eht; ePt; Bt}1t=0,
so to maximize (1), subject to (2)-(4), and taking {yt; Pt; wt; Rt; gt; t}1t=0 as given. The rst-
1Using the Calvo approach to describe nominal rigidities would complicate considerably the analysis, be-
cause then price dispersion becomes an endogenous state variable.
2We abstract from money holdings and seigniorage by considering a cashless-limiteconomy à la Woodford
(1998). Hence, money only imposes a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, i.e., Rt   1  0 for all t.
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order conditions of this problem are (2)-(4) holding with equality, and
 uht
uct
=wt(1  t) (5)
uct
Rt
=
uct+1
t+1
0 =uct

ytd(rt) + rtytd
0(rt)  wt
zt
ytd
0(rt)  

t
rt
rt 1
  1

t
rt 1

+ uct+1

rt+1
rt
t+1   1

rt+1
r2t
t+1;
where rt  ePtPt denotes the relative price and t  PtPt 1 the gross ination rate. Equation (5)
shows that labor-income taxes distort the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption.
In addition to the equations above, a transversality condition, limj!1 (t+juct+jBt+j=Pt+j) =
0; has to hold at all contingencies. We assume private-issued bonds are in zero aggregate net
supply, so the transversality condition is always satised. The same applies to the no-Ponzi-
scheme constraint (4).
2.2 Government
The government consists of two authorities, namely a monetary authority controlling short-
term nominal interest rates Rt and a scal authority determining public-goods provision gt
and income-tax rates t in each period t.3
The government cannot credibly commit in advance to future policies or to repay debt in
the future, i.e., it operates under full discretion. As a consequence, public-goods provision
must be nanced with current taxes only and the governments balanced-budget constraint is
twtht = gt: (6)
3Of course, monetary policy controls the nominal interest rate by adjusting the money supply. This requires
that it owns a stock of private bonds to perform the necessary open market operations. Since we consider a
cashless-limit economy, as in Woodford (1998), the required stock of bonds is innitesimally small, allowing
us to assume that monetary policy controls directly nominal interest rates.
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As a benchmark, we will also consider a Ramsey equilibrium in which the government
commits in advance to future policies and thereby could credibly promise to repay debt. Yet
to facilitate comparison, we will still impose the balanced-budget constraint (6) and set the
initial level of government-issued debt equal to zero.4
2.3 Private-sector equilibrium
We consider a symmetric price-setting equilibrium in which the relative price rt is equal to
1 for all t. It follows that, the rst-order conditions describing householdsbehavior can be
condensed into a price-setting equation, i.e., a Phillips curve
uct(t   1)t = uctht


1 +  + 

uht
uct
  gt
ht

+ uct+1(t+1   1)t+1; (7)
and a consumption-Euler equation
uct
Rt
= 
uct+1
t+1
: (8)
Conveniently, the last two equations do not make reference to taxes and real wages. Rather
these are determined by (5) and (6) which give
t =
gt
gt   ht uhtuct
(9)
wt =
gt
ht
  uht
uct
: (10)
A private-sector equilibrium, therefore, consists of a plan fct; ht;tg satisfying (7), (8),
and a market-clearing condition (resource constraint)
ht = ct +

2
(t   1)2 + gt; (11)
taking policies fgt; Rt  1g as given.5
4The absence of government-issued debt implies we abstract from monetary and scal interactions operating
directly through the governments budget constraint, see Díaz-Giménez et al. (2008).
5The initial price level P 1 can be ignored, because it only normalizes the price-level path.
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3 Policy regimes and biases
In this section, we study policy regimes with and without commitment to future policies and
the associated equilibrium allocations. We start by studying the rst-best allocation, which
assumes policy commitment and abstracts from monopoly and tax distortions and nominal
rigidities. We then study a Ramsey allocation, which accounts for monopoly distortions,
nominal rigidities, and distortionary labor-income taxes. Finally, we relax the assumption of
policy commitment and study allocations under sequential policymaking, taking into account
all aforementioned distortions. We show that sequential-scal policy causes too much public
spending, while sequential-monetary policy causes too much ination.
3.1 First-best and Ramsey allocation
The rst-best allocation, which abstracts from all distortions and commitment problems,
satises in steady state the following condition:6
uc = ug =  uh:
It is thus optimal to equate the marginal utility of private and public consumption to the
marginal disutility of labor e¤ort. This condition follows directly from the linearity of the
production function and the preference structure. As we show next, the condition is no longer
optimal when the distortions in the economy are taken into account even if policymakers can
credibly commit.
The Ramsey allocation, which accounts for tax and monopoly distortions and nominal
rigidities, must satisfy the implementability constraints (7) and (8) and the resource constraint
6The condition follows from solving maxfct;ht;gtg1t=0
P1
t=0 
tu(ct; ht; gt), subject to (11) with  = 0 and
from imposing on the resulting rst-order conditions a steady-state restriction.
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(11). It solves the following problem:
max
fct;ht;t;Rt1;gtg1t=0
1X
t=0
tu(ct; ht; gt) (12)
subject to (7), (8), and (11) for all t:
Note, the Ramsey allocation still allows for advance-policy commitment. The rst-order
conditions of this problem show that the Ramsey steady state satises
 = 1 and R =
1

; (13)
as well as marginal conditions
 uh < ug (14)
 uh =

1 + 

  g
h

uc: (15)
See appendix A.1 for derivations. Equation (13) shows that it is optimal to achieve price
stability. In addition, (14) shows that public spending in the Ramsey allocation falls short
of its rst-best level. This is optimal because public spending increases taxes and thereby
the wedge between the marginal utility of private consumption and the marginal disutility of
labor e¤ort, see equation (15). This wedge has two components. The rst component is due to
the monopoly power of rms, which causes real wages to fall short of their marginal product.7
The second component which is missing in the setting of Adam and Billi (2008) stems from
distortionary labor-income taxes levied to nance public spending. Reducing public spending
below the rst-best level lowers taxes and reduces this wedge.
3.2 Sequential-policy regimes
We now study separate monetary and scal authorities that cannot commit in advance to
future policies and, instead, decide policies sequentially at the time of implementation. We
7Equations (10) and (15) imply w = (1 + ) = < 1.
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derive a policy-reaction function for each authority. To facilitate the exposition, we assume
each authority takes the current policy of the other authority and all future private-sector
and policy decisions as given. We then verify the rationality of this assumption and dene a
sequential-policy equilibrium.
3.2.1 Sequential-scal policy: spending bias
Based on the assumptions made, the scal authoritys problem in period t is
max
(ct;ht;t;gt)
1X
j=0
ju(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j) (16)
subject to (7), (8), and (11) for all t
and fct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j 1  1; gt+jg given for j  1:
In this problem the scal authority takes current monetary policy Rt and future decisions
as given. Eliminating Lagrange multipliers from the rst-order conditions of the problem
delivers a scal-reaction function
ugt =  uht 2t   1  (t   1)
2t   1  (t   1)

1 +  +  uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct
 : (FRF)
See appendix A.2 for the derivation. This FRF determines (implicitly) the optimal level
of public-goods provision gt in each period t under sequential-scal policy.
To study the implications of sequential-scal policy, consider a steady state in which policy
achieves price stability ( = 1) as in the Ramsey allocation. The FRF then simplies to
ug =  uh: (17)
Under price stability, scal policy thus equates the marginal utility of public consumption to
the marginal disutility of labor e¤ort. Such behavior is consistent with the rst-best allocation,
but suboptimal in the presence of tax and monopoly distortions that require reducing public
spending below its rst-best level, see the Ramsey optimality condition (14). Sequential-scal
policy, therefore, causes a spending biasas summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 1 Sequential-scal policy under price stability causes a spending bias.
The intuition for this nding is as follows. Since scal policy takes future allocations
and the monetary policy decision Rt as given, the Euler equation (8) implies that private
consumption is equally perceived as given. A discretionary scal policymaker thus perceives
to a¤ect labor supply one-for-one with public spending and to have no distortionary e¤ects on
private consumption, which implies rule (17) is optimal. But in equilibrium future spending
and tax decisions do a¤ect future labor supply and future private consumption. Low future
consumption then adversely a¤ects current consumption via the anticipation e¤ects implicit
in the Euler equation. But a discretionary policymaker does not perceive the e¤ects that
current policy have on past decisions of forward-looking households.
In general when price stability is not achieved, the scal policymaker also takes into account
that any additional public spending increases ination and that this involves non-zero marginal
resource costs.8 These marginal resource costs of ination therefore lead to the more general
expression FRF.
3.2.2 Sequential-monetary policy: ination bias
The monetary authoritys problem in period t is
max
(ct;ht;t;Rt1)
1X
j=0
ju(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j) (18)
subject to (7), (8), and (11) for all t
and fct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j  1; gt+j 1g given for j  1:
In this problem the monetary authority takes current scal policy gt and future decisions
as given. Eliminating Lagrange multipliers from the rst-order conditions of the problem
8Recall that scal policy perceives output to move one-for-one with public spending, because it perceives
private consumption as given. Therefore public spending implies an increase in wages and, via the Phillips
curve (7), an increase in ination.
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delivers a monetary-reaction function
  uct
uht
( (t   1)  t)  (t   1) 

1 + ht
uhht
uht

+ 2t   1  ucct
uct
(t   1)

(t   1)t   ht

1 +     gt
ht

= 0: (MRF)
Appendix A.3 shows the derivation. This MRF determines (implicitly) the optimal level
of nominal interest rates Rt in each period t under sequential-monetary policy.
Consider again a steady state in which policy achieves price stability ( = 1) as in the
Ramsey allocation. MRF then simplies to
uc =  uh:
Under price stability, monetary policy thus equates the marginal utility of private con-
sumption to the marginal disutility of labor e¤ort. Again such behavior is consistent with
the rst-best allocation and suboptimal in the presence of monopoly and tax distortions, see
the Ramsey optimality condition (15). Monetary policy thus seeks to increase output above
the Ramsey steady state and the MRF is actually inconsistent with price stability. Therefore
sequential-monetary policy causes an ination bias,as in the standard case with exogenous
scal policy studied, for example, in Svensson (1997) and in Walsh (1995). This result is
captured in the following proposition, which is formally proven in appendix A.4:
Proposition 2 Sequential-monetary policy causes an inationary bias: the steady-state gross
ination rate  is strictly bigger than 1, provided the discount factor  is su¢ ciently close to
1.
3.2.3 Sequential-policy (SP) equilibrium
We now dene a sequential-policy equilibrium. We start by verifying the rationality of the
assumption we made that each authority can take the current policy of the other authority
and all future decisions as given. When solving the scal authoritys problem (16) and the
11
monetary authoritys problem (18), we observe (7), (8), and (11) depend on current and future
decisions only.9 This observation suggests the existence of an equilibrium in which indeed
current policy is independent of past decisions and, in turn, future policy is independent of
current decisions. Also the resulting policy-reaction functions FRF and MRF then depend on
current decisions only.
Based on these considerations, we can formally dene a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
under sequential monetary and scal policy.10 In such a Nash equilibrium, the monetary
and scal authorities decide their respective policies simultaneously in each period with each
authority deciding policy based on its own policy-reaction function:
Denition 3 (SP) A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium under sequential monetary and scal
policy is a steady state fc; h;; R  1; gg satisfying (7), (8), (11), FRF, and MRF.
Importantly, the assumption of simultaneous-policy decisions does not matter for the equi-
librium outcome. This is because the monetary and scal authorities share the same objective
function.11 In section 5, where the two authorities pursue di¤erent objectives due to mone-
tary conservatism, the (within-period) timing of policy decisions will start to matter for the
equilibrium outcome.
9There are no state variables in the model.
10The concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium, as dened in Maskin and Tirole (2001), gures prominently
in applied game theory. See for example Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008).
11Consider a Stackelberg game in which one authority decides before the other each period. Then, provided
both players share the same policy objective, the followers policy-reaction function does not need to be
imposed as a constraint in the leaders problem. Rather, it can be derived directly from the leaders rst-order
conditions.
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4 How much ination is optimal?
We have shown sequential-scal policy spends too much on public goods, while sequential-
monetary policy gives rise to an ination bias. In this section, we quantify these policy
biases. As a point of reference, we rst describe an optimal-ination regime in which the
monetary authority is capable of advance-policy commitment, but scal policy follows the
reaction function FRF. We then determine the equilibrium outcome without monetary and
scal policy commitment in a calibrated version of the model. Comparing the outcome in this
latter setting with that in the optimal-ination regime, we argue that installing an ination-
conservative central bank is desirable for society as it may result in large welfare gains.
4.1 Optimal-ination (OI) regime
This section considers an intermediate policy problem in which the monetary authority can
commit in advance to future policies, while the scal authority determines its actions according
to the reaction function FRF. This policy problem is of interest because it allows to determine
the welfare-optimal ination rate in the presence of discretionary scal policy. The policy
problem is
max
fct;ht;t;Rt1;gtg1t=0
1X
t=0
tu(ct; ht; gt) (OI)
subject to (7), (8), (11), and FRF for all t.
And we refer to it as the optimal-ination (OI) regime. In this regime, the monetary
authority sets an equilibrium ination rate which accounts for the scal authoritys inability
to commit in advance to future policies.12 It contrasts with the sequential-policy (SP) regime,
described in the previous section, which also accounts for the monetary authoritys inability to
12In steady state, equation (8) implies  = R. Thereby the monetary authority, by setting the gross
nominal interest rate R, determines the gross ination rate .
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commit. If ination in the OI regime lies below that emerging in the SP regime, this suggests
ination conservatism is desirable to the extent that it is e¤ective in lowering the equilibrium
ination rate in the economy.
4.2 Calibration
We now turn to numerical results. We calibrate the model as in Adam and Billi (2008), so to
make the results comparable. Accordingly, household preferences are specied as
u(ct; ht; gt) = log (ct)  !h h
1+'
t
1 + '
+ !g log (gt) ; (19)
where !h > 0, !g  0, and '  0.13
The baseline parameter values are shown in table 1. In the baseline, the discount factor
 is equal to 0:9913 quarterly, which implies a real interest rate of 3:5 percent annually. The
price elasticity of demand  is equal to  6, so the mark-up of prices over marginal costs is
20 percent.14 The degree of price stickiness  is equal to 17:5, so the log-linearized version
of Phillips curve (7) is consistent with that in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). And the
labor-supply elasticity ' 1 is equal to 1. In addition, we set the utility weights !h and !g
such that in the Ramsey allocation agents work 20 percent of their time (h equal to 0:2) and
spend 20 percent of output on public goods (g equal to 0:04).15 Thereby the labor-income tax
rate  is 24 percent.
We tested the robustness of the numerical results across a wide range of parameter values,
and by using in the numerical procedure di¤erent starting values for the allocation. As we
will show below, the results are found to be robust.16
13This specication is consistent with balanced growth.
14The mark-up  is given by 1 +  = = (1 + ).
15We set the utility weights using (47) and (51) in appendix A.5.
16To make the Ramsey allocation invariant to changes in parameter values, we adjust the utility weights !h
and !g. Using di¤erent starting values for the allocation, we did not encounter multiplicities in the equilibrium
allocation under any of the policy regimes.
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4.3 Quantifying policy biases
The e¤ects of sequential policy under the baseline parameterization are shown in table 2. The
second column shows the e¤ects on the equilibrium allocation, i.e., on private consumption
c, hours worked h, gross ination , and public goods g. These e¤ects are measured as the
di¤erence from the Ramsey allocation.17 The third column shows the labor-income tax rate.
And the last column shows the welfare loss as measured by the permanent loss in private
consumption compared with the Ramsey allocation.18
The e¤ects in the SP regime are shown in the rst row of table 2. In such a regime, the
ination bias is found to be sizable. In fact, ination is roughly 4:5 percent higher than in
the Ramsey allocation. Also the spending bias is found to be sizable, with spending on public
goods roughly 14 percent higher than in the Ramsey allocation. Overall, therefore, the welfare
loss due to sequential policy is big, and equivalent to foregoing more than 8 percent of private
consumption each period compared with the Ramsey allocation. Although about 80 percent
of the welfare loss is due to the resource costs of ination, the remaining 20 percent of the loss
is due to distorted allocations between hours worked, private consumption, and public goods.
The latter 20 percent of the loss is equivalent to foregoing 1.6 percent of consumption each
period. Therefore the welfare losses is large by conventional standards even when abstracting
from the resource costs of ination.
The e¤ects in the OI regime are shown in the second row of table 2. In this regime, the
ination bias remains sizable, but is less than half of that in the SP regime. The fact that
the optimal ination rate in the OI regime is below the ination bias emerging in the SP
regime indicates that indeed ination conservatism would be desirable for society. Moreover,
17In the Ramsey allocation c = 0:16, h = 0:2,  = 1, g = 0:04, and  = 0:24:
18More specically, the welfare loss is measured as the permanent reduction in private consumption that
would make welfare in the Ramsey allocation equivalent to welfare in the policy regime considered. See
appendix A.6.
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the welfare loss in the OI regime is about one half of that in the SP regime, which suggests
that ination conservatism may result in large welfare gains. Interestingly, the scal spending
bias increases roughly by a factor of three compared to the SP regime. This is because lower
ination reduces the scal authoritys perceived costs of public spending, as discussed before.19
Despite the high level of public spending, hours worked in the OI regime are roughly the same
as in the Ramsey allocation. Now only about 30 percent of the welfare loss is due to the
resource costs of ination, while the remaining 70 percent of the loss is largely due to the
distortion in the allocation between private consumption and public goods. The latter 70
percent of the loss now amounts to foregoing 3.3 percent of consumption each period, which
indeed is large by conventional standards.
These ndings are robust across a wide range of parameter values. The last two columns
of table 3 show that the potential welfare gains from ination conservatism remain sizable
across a wide range of model parameterizations. They disappear, however, in the limiting
cases when prices become exible ( su¢ ciently close to zero), when goods markets become
competitive ( su¢ ciently low), and when labor supply becomes inelastic (' su¢ ciently high).
Still, the optimal ination rate in the OI regime lies below that in the SP regime for all the
parameterizations, see the second column of table 3. This suggests that ination conservatism
remains desirable across a wide range of model parameterizations.
5 Conservative monetary authority
The previous section has shown that lowering ination below the outcome emerging with
sequential monetary and scal policy is highly desirable in welfare terms. In this section,
we introduce an ination-conservative monetary authority and asses to what extent ination
conservatism can deliver these welfare gains when both policymakers continue to determine
19This e¤ect can be shown analytically in a setting in which taxes are lump sum, see Adam and Billi (2008).
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policy sequentially. We consider three policy regimes, namely regimes in which monetary
policy is decided before, simultaneously, or after scal policy within each period. We show that
ination conservatism is particularly desirable when scal policy is decided before monetary
policy as it is then possible to recover the Ramsey steady state, despite both policymakers
acting sequentially.
5.1 Ination conservatism
As in Rogo¤(1985) and in Adam and Billi (2008), we consider a sequential-monetary authority
that not only cares about societys welfare, but also dislikes ination directly. We model this
by replacing the monetary authoritys objective in each period t with a more general, ination-
conservative objective
(1  )u(ct; ht; gt)  (t   1)
2
2
; (20)
where  2 [0; 1]measures the degree of the monetary authoritys ination conservatism. When
 is equal to zero the monetary authority cares about societys welfare only, as assumed in the
analysis so far. When  is strictly bigger than zero the monetary authority dislikes ination
more than suggested by social preferences, and as  approaches 1 the monetary authority
starts to become exclusively concerned about ination.
The scal authority continues to be concerned about social welfare only, i.e., the objective
of the scal authority remains unchanged. With monetary and scal authorities no longer
pursuing the same policy objective, the (within-period) timing of policy decisions now matters
for the equilibrium outcome. Therefore we consider a Nash equilibrium and also Stackelberg
equilibria with monetary and scal leadership.
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5.2 Nash equilibrium
We start by considering the policy regime in which the monetary and scal authorities decide
policies simultaneously each period. In such a Nash regime, the scal authoritys problem
remains unchanged and continues to take the monetary policy decision as given. Fiscal be-
havior thus continues to be described by the reaction function FRF. However, the monetary
authoritys problem in period t is now given by
max
(ct;ht;t;Rt1)
1X
j=0
j

(1  )u(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j)  (t+j   1)
2
2

(21)
subject to (7), (8), and (11) for all t
and fct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j  1; gt+j 1g given for j  1:
In this problem the monetary authority still takes current scal policy gt and future deci-
sions as given. Eliminating Lagrange multipliers from the rst-order conditions of the problem
delivers a conservative monetary-reaction function
  uct
uht
( (t   1)  t)  (t   1) 

1 + ht
uhht
uht

+

2t   1  ucct
uct
(t   1)

(t   1)t   ht

1 +     gt
ht

(1  )     1
uht
(1  )  +  1
uct
= 0:
(CMRF)
See appendix A.7 for the derivation. When  is equal to zero CMRF simplies to MRF,
which is the monetary-reaction function without ination conservatism. As before, CMRF
still depends on current decisions only. Therefore it continues to be rational to take the
current policy of the other authority and all future decisions as given. We can then dene a
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with conservative monetary policy as follows:
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Denition 4 (CSP-Nash) A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with conservative and se-
quential monetary policy, sequential-scal policy, and simultaneous-policy decisions is a steady
state fc; h;; R  1; gg satisfying (7), (8), (11), FRF, and CMRF.
5.3 Stackelberg equilibria
We now consider Stackelberg equilibria where one of the policymakers decides before the other
each period. We start by considering a setting with monetary leadership (ML). Again, since
the scal authority takes monetary decisions as given, its policy problem remains unchanged
and its optimal behavior is described by the reaction function FRF. The monetary authority,
however, takes into account FRF as an additional constraint, and its problem in period t
becomes
max
(ct;ht;t;gt;Rt1)
1X
j=0
j

(1  )u(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j)  (t+j   1)
2
2

(22)
subject to (7), (8), (11), and FRF for all t
and fct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j  1; gt+jg given for j  1:
In this problem the monetary authority still takes future decisions as given, but now
anticipates how its choices a¤ect the current scal-policy decision. Eliminating Lagrange
multipliers from the rst-order conditions of the problem delivers a conservative monetary-
reaction function under monetary leadership, which we denote as CMRF-ML. The resulting
equilibrium denition then is the following:
Denition 5 (CSP-ML) A Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium with conservative and
sequential monetary policy, sequential-scal policy, and monetary policy decided before scal
policy is a steady state fc; h;; R  1; gg satisfying (7), (8), (11), FRF, and CMRF-ML.
Next, consider the opposite setting with scal leadership (FL). Since the monetary author-
ity decides second, it takes scal decisions as given. Therefore its reaction function continues
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to be CMRF, which needs to be imposed as a constraint on the scal authoritys problem
max
(ct;ht;t;gt;Rt1)
1X
j=0
ju(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j) (23)
subject to (7), (8), (11), and CMRF for all t
and fct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j  1; gt+jg given for j  1:
In this problem the scal authority still takes future decisions as given, but anticipates
the within-period reaction of nominal interest rates Rt as implied by CMRF. Eliminating
Lagrange multipliers from the rst-order conditions of the problem delivers a conservative
scal-reaction function under scal leadership, which we denote as CFRF-FL. The resulting
Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium is dened as follows:
Denition 6 (CSP-FL) A Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium with conservative and se-
quential monetary policy, sequential-scal policy, and scal policy decided before monetary
policy is a steady state fc; h;; R  1; gg satisfying (7), (8), (11), CFRF-FL, and CMRF.
5.4 E¤ects of ination conservatism
We now discuss the di¤erent policy regimes and compare the e¤ects of ination conservatism.
In the Nash and ML regimes, the scal authoritys reaction function is given by FRF. As a
consequence, welfare in these regimes cannot exceed that of the OI regime. The situation
is di¤erent in the FL regime where the scal authority anticipates within each period the
monetary authoritys ination conservatism. This regime allows monetary conservatism to
discipline the behavior of the scal authority, and thereby welfare may end up higher than in
the OI regime.
Using the baseline parameterization, gure 1 shows the welfare gain from ination conser-
vatism. The gure shows the consumption-equivalent welfare losses (vertical axis) in deviation
from the Ramsey outcome as a function of the degree of ination conservatism  (horizontal
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axis). Besides showing the outcome under the three di¤erent timing protocols, the gure also
shows a solid-horizontal line that corresponds to the welfare loss in the OI regime.
In the Nash and ML regimes, welfare increases with the degree of ination conservatism
and a value of  just slightly below 1 recovers the level of welfare in the OI regime. But
increasing  all the way to 1 causes a steep welfare loss relative to the OI regime, which
shows that full ination conservatism ( = 1) is not optimal under these timing protocols.
An explanation for this non-monotone e¤ect is provided below.
Regarding the FL regime, welfare again increases with , but now monotonically, and
reaches the Ramsey-steady-state level as  is increased all the way to 1. With scal leadership,
therefore, full ination conservatism eliminates the steady-state distortions associated with
lack of monetary and scal commitment.
Overall, gure 1 suggests that ination conservatism is desirable, because then welfare
is always higher, for all timing protocols and for all values of . With monetary leadership
and with simultaneous policy decisions, however, it is not optimal for monetary policy to be
exclusively concerned about ination stabilization ( = 1). The reason for this nding can be
uncovered by considering the allocational e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of ination conservatism
under the di¤erent timing protocols.
Again using the baseline parameterization, gure 2 shows the e¤ects of di¤erent degrees
of ination conservatism (horizontal axis) on the equilibrium outcomes. As shown, ination
conservatism unambiguously lowers the equilibrium ination rate (lower-left panel) and hours
worked (top-right panel). The latter e¤ect occurs partly because lower ination gives rise to
lower resource costs.
The e¤ects on the scal-spending bias (lower-right panel), however, depend crucially on
whether the scal authority internalizes the monetary authoritys direct reaction to ination,
i.e., on whether scal policy moves before monetary policy. Ination conservatism reduces the
scal-spending bias in the FL regime but increases it strongly in the Nash and ML regimes,
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which results in large welfare losses as  approaches 1.
This divergence in outcomes can be rationalized as follows. As explained above, ination
conservatism lowers the equilibrium ination rate. As a result, it also lowers the marginal
resource costs of ination, so the perceived costs of additional ination caused by additional
public spending are equally lower. Therefore when scal policy takes monetary policy as given,
as in the Nash and ML regimes, lower ination induces the scal authority to increase public
spending. But in the FL regime the scal authority anticipates that higher public spending
will come at the cost of higher nominal interest rates, because the monetary authority will
tighten monetary policy to partially o¤set a rise in ination. The consumption Euler equation
(8) then implies that the scal authority perceives that public spending crowds out private
consumption in the current period. Indeed for  equal to 1 the scal authority anticipates that
higher public spending lowers private consumption one-for-one, as monetary policy does not
tolerate any ination and any change in hours worked. Fiscal policy then correctly perceives
the one-for-one trade-o¤ between private consumption and public spending as implied by the
production function. Therefore scal policy implements the Ramsey level of public spending
even though it lacks the ability to commit to future policies.
Table 4 displays the optimal degree of ination conservatism (opt) for the Nash and ML
regimes and a wide range of model parameterizations. It shows that, independently from
the precise parameter values, the central bank should predominantly be concerned about
ination in these regimes. At the same time, however, increasing monetary conservatism to
the maximum degree ( = 1) is severely suboptimal. As the last two columns table 4 show,
such a move is typically associated with welfare losses that are equivalent to several percentage
points of consumption each period. The ndings from the baseline calibration are thus robust
across many model parameterizations.
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6 Conclusions
We study interactions between discretionary monetary and scal policymakers when monetary
policy sets nominal interest rates and scal policy provides public goods that are nanced with
distortionary taxes. The welfare loss resulting from sequential policymaking is found to be
equivalent to foregoing several percent of private consumption each period. This welfare loss,
however, can be largely reduced and even eliminated by appointing a conservative monetary
authority, who dislikes ination more than society does.
A high degree of ination conservatism is found to be optimal for any timing assumption
on the sequence of moves in the non-cooperative game between monetary and scal policy-
makers. But it is suboptimal for the monetary authority to focus exclusively on ination
stabilization when the scal authority fails to anticipate that its policy decision a¤ects the
monetary authoritys interest-rate decision. When such anticipation of policy interactions oc-
curs, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on ination stabilization. Full ination
conservatism then eliminates the steady-state distortions associated with lack of monetary
and scal commitment.
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A Appendix
A.1 Ramsey allocation
The Lagrangian of the Ramsey problem (12) is
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max
fct;ht;t;Rt;gtg1t=0
1X
t=0
t
n
u(ct; ht; gt)
+ 1t

uct(t   1)t   uctht


1 +  + 

uht
uct
  gt
ht

  uct+1(t+1   1)t+1

+ 2t

uct
Rt
  uct+1
t+1

+3t

ht   ct   
2
(t   1)2   gt

:
The rst-order conditions with respect to ct; ht;t; Rt; and gt, respectively, are
uct + 
1
t

ucct(t   1)t   ucctht


1 +     gt
ht

 1t 1ucct(t   1)t + 2t
ucct
Rt
  2t 1
ucct
t
  3t = 0 (24)
uht   1t
uct


1 +  + 

uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct

+ 3t = 0 (25) 
1t   1t 1

uct(2t   1) + 2t 1
uct
2t
  3t (t   1) = 0 (26)
 2t
uct
R2t
= 0 (27)
ugt + 
1
t
uct

   3t = 0; (28)
where j 1 = 0 for j = 1; 2.
We recover the steady state by dropping time subscripts. Then condition (27), uct > 0,
and Rt  1 imply
2 = 0:
This and (26) give
 = 1:
From (8) then follows
R =
1

:
The last two results deliver (13), as claimed in the text. Then (7) gives
 uh
uc
=
1 + 

  g
h
< 1: (29)
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This delivers (15), as claimed in the text. Based on these results, conditions (24), (25),
and (28), respectively, simplify to
uc   1ucch


1 +     g
h

  3 = 0 (30)
uh   1uc


1 +  + 

uh
uc
+ h
uhh
uc

+ 3 = 0 (31)
ug + 
1uc

   3 = 0: (32)
Eliminating 3 from (31) and (32) gives
uh + ug
uc


1 +  uh
uc
+ huhh
uc
 = 1; (33)
which shows  uh < ug, as claimed by (14) in the text, provided 1 > 0.
Now, in fact, we show 1  0 contradicts (29). Because then (33) implies ug   uh, while
(32) implies 3  ug. Thereby (30) gives
uc = 
3 + 1
ucch


1 +     g
h

< 3
 ug
  uh;
where the rst inequality uses 1 +    g=h < 0 from (29). Therefore uc   uh, which
contradicts (29) as claimed.
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A.2 Fiscal-reaction function
The Lagrangian of the scal authoritys problem (16) is
max
fct+j ;ht+j ;t+j ;gt+jg
1X
j=0
j
n
u(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j)
+ 1t+j

uct+j(t+j   1)t+j   uct+jht+j


1 +  + 

uht+j
uct+j
  gt+j
ht+j

  uct+j+1(t+j+1   1)t+j+1
i
+ 2t+j

uct+j
Rt+j
  uct+j+1
t+j+1

+3t+j

ht+j   ct+j   
2
(t+j   1)2   gt+j

;
where ct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j 1; and gt+j are taken as given for j  1.
The rst-order conditions with respect to ct; ht;t; and gt, respectively, are
uct + 
1
t

ucct(t   1)t   ucctht


1 +     gt
ht

+ 2t
ucct
Rt
  3t = 0 (34)
uht   1t
uct


1 +  + 

uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct

+ 3t = 0 (35)
1t uct(2t   1)  3t (t   1) = 0 (36)
ugt + 
1
t
uct

   3t = 0: (37)
Conditions (36) and (37) imply
1t =
ugt(t   1)
uct(2t   1  (t   1)) :
Using this and (37) to eliminate 3t in (35) delivers FRF, as claimed in the text.
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A.3 Monetary-reaction function
The Lagrangian of the monetary authoritys problem (18) is
max
fct+j ;ht+j ;t+j ;Rt+jg
1X
j=0
j
n
u(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j)
+ 1t+j

uct+j(t+j   1)t+j   uct+jht+j


1 +  + 

uht+j
uct+j
  gt+j
ht+j

  uct+j+1(t+j+1   1)t+j+1
i
+ 2t+j

uct+j
Rt+j
  uct+j+1
t+j+1

+3t+j

ht+j   ct+j   
2
(t+j   1)2   gt+j

;
where ct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j; and gt+j 1 are taken as given for j  1.
The rst-order conditions with respect to ct; ht;t; and Rt, respectively, are
uct + 
1
t

ucct(t   1)t   ucctht


1 +     gt
ht

+ 2t
ucct
Rt
  3t = 0 (38)
uht   1t
uct


1 +  + 

uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct

+ 3t = 0 (39)
1t uct(2t   1)  3t (t   1) = 0 (40)
 2t
uct
R2t
= 0: (41)
Condition (41), uct > 0, and Rt  1 imply
2t = 0:
Next, (38), (39), and (40), respectively, give
3t = uct + 
1
t

ucct(t   1)t   ucctht


1 +     gt
ht

(42)
3t =  uht + 1t
uct


1 +  + 

uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct

(43)
3t = 
1
t
uct (2t   1)
 (t   1) : (44)
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Then (42) and (44) imply
1t =

2t 1
t 1   ucctuct

(t   1)t   ht

1 +     gt
ht
 : (45)
While (43) and (44) imply
1t =

uct
uht
h
1 +    2t 1
t 1 + 

uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct
i : (46)
Therefore equating (45) and (46) delivers MRF, as claimed in the text.
A.4 Proof of proposition 2
In a steady state in which  = 1 the MRF simplies to  uh = uc. At the same time, though,
equation (7) implies  uh < uc when  = 1. The MRF then cannot hold at  = 1. Moreover,
equation (8) and R  1 imply   . Therefore it must be that  > 1 if  is su¢ ciently
close to 1, as claimed.
A.5 Utility weights
With household preferences (19), the Ramsey marginal condition (15) implies
!h =
1
ch'

1 + 

  g
h

: (47)
While rst-order conditions (24), (25), and (28), respectively, imply
uc   1

ucch


1 +     g
h

  3 = 0 (48)
uh   1uc


1 +  + 

uh
uc
+ ht
uhh
uc

+ 3 = 0 (49)
ug + 
1uc

   3 = 0: (50)
Eliminating 3 from (48) and (49) gives
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1 =
uc + uh
ucch

 
1 +     g
h

+ uc


1 +  + 

uh
uc
+ ht
uhh
uc
 :
Equation (48) also gives
3 = uc   1

ucch


1 +     g
h

:
Then (50) delivers
!g = g

3   11
c



: (51)
A.6 Welfare loss
Let u (c; h; g) denote period utility in the Ramsey allocation, and let u
 
cA; hA; gA

denote
period utility in an alternative policy regime. Then the permanent reduction in private con-
sumption, A  0, that would make welfare in the Ramsey allocation equivalent to welfare in
the alternative policy regime, is given by
1
1  u
 
cA; hA; gA

=
1
1  u
 
c(1 + A); h; g

=
1
1  

u (c; h; g) + log
 
1 + A

;
where the second equality uses (19). Therefore
A = exp

u
 
cA; hA; gA
  u (c; h; g)  1:
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A.7 Conservative monetary-reaction function
The Lagrangian of the conservative monetary authoritys problem (20) is
max
fct+j ;ht+j ;t+j ;Rt+jg
1X
j=0
j
n
(1  )u(ct+j; ht+j; gt+j)  
2
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t+j+1

+3t+j

ht+j   ct+j   
2
(t+j   1)2   gt+j

;
where ct+j; ht+j;t+j; Rt+j; and gt+j 1 are taken as given for j  1.
The rst-order conditions with respect to ct; ht;t; and Rt, respectively, are
(1  )uct + 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
ucct(t   1)t   ucctht


1 +     gt
ht

+ 2t
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Rt
  3t = 0 (52)
(1  )uht   1t
uct


1 +  + 
uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct

+ 3t = 0 (53)
1t uct(2t   1)  3t (t   1)   (t   1) = 0 (54)
 2t
uct
R2t
= 0: (55)
Conditions (55), uct > 0, and Rt  1 imply
2t = 0:
Next, (52), (53), and (54), respectively, give
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)uct + 1t

ucct(t   1)t   ucctht

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ht

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
(57)
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1
t
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
: (58)
Then (56) and (58) imply
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1t =


1  + 1
uct



2t 1
t 1   ucctuct

(t   1)t   ht

1 +     gt
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 : (59)
While (57) and (58) imply
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
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1    1
uht



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uht

1 +    2t 1
t 1 + 

uht
uct
+ ht
uhht
uct
 : (60)
Therefore equating (59) and (60) delivers CMRF, as claimed in the text.
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Denition Parameter Value
Discount factor  0:9913 quarterly
Price elasticity of demand   6
Degree of price stickiness  17:5
Labor-supply elasticity ' 1 1
Labor-income tax rate  24%
Utility weight on labor e¤ort !h 19:7917
Utility weight on public goods !g 0:2656
Table 1: Baseline calibration
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Policy regime c h  g  Welfare loss
Di¤erence from Ramsey (%) Level (%) Di¤erence from Ramsey (%)
SP  7:08 5:90 4:47 14:21 25:71  8:26
OI  13:73  0:05 2:11 44:89 34:67  4:76
Notes: Using the baseline calibration, the table shows the e¤ects in steady state of sequential
monetary and scal policy (SP), and of an optimal-ination (OI) regime in which monetary
policy is committed in advance. Shown are the e¤ects on private consumption c, hours
worked h, gross ination , public goods g, the labor-income tax rate  , and the welfare
loss as measured by the permanent loss in private consumption.
Table 2: E¤ects of sequential policy
34
Calibration SP   OI Welfare loss
(%) Di¤erence from Ramsey (%)
SP OI
Baseline 2:36  8:26  4:76
Stickier prices ( = 50) 2:04  11:70  5:92
Less sticky prices ( = 5) 2:13  4:20  2:94
Almost exible prices ( = 0:1) 0:15  0:13  0:13
Less competition ( =  5) 2:61  11:90  7:56
More competition ( =  9) 1:31  3:28  1:92
Almost perfect competition ( =  30) 0:06  0:16  0:15
High labor-supply elasticity (' = 0:1) 3:27  11:60  6:89
Low labor-supply elasticity (' = 3) 0:73  3:14  2:39
Almost inelastic labor supply (' = 8) 0:07  0:66  0:62
Notes: See notes to table 2. The middle column shows the di¤erence between gross
ination in the SP regime and in the OI regime. A positive value of such di¤erence
indicates ination conservatism is desirable.
Table 3: Robustness of the e¤ects of sequential policy
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Calibration opt Welfare loss
Di¤erence from Ramsey (%)
Nash ML Nash and ML
 = opt  = 1
Baseline 0:995 0:997  4:76  7:96
Stickier prices ( = 50) 0:999 0:999  5:92  7:96
Less sticky prices ( = 5) 0:963 0:982  2:94  7:96
Almost exible prices ( = 0:1) 0:015 0:300  0:13  7:96
Less competition ( =  5) 0:995 0:996  7:56  13:71
More competition ( =  9) 0:993 0:996  1:92  3:76
Almost perfect competition ( =  30) 0:939 0:991  0:15  1:40
High labor-supply elasticity (' = 0:1) 0:996 0:996  6:89  10:94
Low labor-supply elasticity (' = 3) 0:987 0:996  2:39  6:52
Almost inelastic labor supply (' = 8) 0:925 0:993  0:62  5:83
Notes: See notes to table 2. The middle column shows the optimal degree of ination
conservatism that in the Nash and monetary leadership (ML) regimes recovers the
level of welfare of the OI regime.
Table 4: Robustness of the welfare gain from ination conservatism
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Figure 1: Welfare gain from ination conservatism under the baseline calibration
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Figure 2: E¤ects of ination conservatism under the baseline calibration
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